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wrongly by willfully failing to learn Esperanto. And it’s an intuition that 
springs up in response not to some bizarre thought experiment, but in 
response to a situation that I am in fact in; I have just navigated away 
from the webpage that would have given me access to the free classes and 
I don’t intend to return to it. Given that we don’t actually live in a world 
of saints, shouldn’t we behave differently from the way that we should 
behave if we did? Aren’t we at least permitted to behave differently? It 
seems to me that we should and that we are so permitted; it seems to me 
that according to the Triple Theory, we should not and are not. And thus 
the Triple Theory seems wrong to me.
On What Matters is a closely-argued and detailed investigation of some 
of the main metaethical issues (there are notable absences: discussion of 
God and free will is rather brisk) and of the commonalities between three 
great traditions of normative theory: Kantianism, Consequentialism, and 
Contractualism. I hazard that nobody will agree with it in its entirety, but 
anyone with interests in any of the topics on which it dwells will find 
much of value in it and that it amply rewards what it demands: careful 
reading and re-reading.
In Adam’s Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin, by Ian 
A. McFarland. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 256 pages. $120 (hardcover).
MATTHEW BARRETT, California Baptist University
Few doctrines are as difficult and controversial as the doctrine of original 
sin. To the modern thinker, the doctrine of original sin is absurd. How can 
one person’s sin eons and eons ago determine the status and nature of all 
humanity? But when we open the pages of Scripture, we quickly see that 
the doctrine of original sin is a biblical doctrine, taught by the apostle Paul 
himself. Therefore, it is safe to say that the doctrine of original sin is a 
Christian belief. Where controversy arises, however, is in exactly how we, 
as Christians, should define original sin.
Ian McFarland has sought to tackle this very issue, though from a more 
philosophical and historical perspective. His thesis is straightforward and 
ambitious:
In reaction to a wide range of criticisms leveled against the idea of original 
sin, a number of Christian theologians in the modern period have attempt-
ed to develop a doctrine of sin in which the idea of original sin is heavily 
qualified or even rejected. Against these perspectives, I will argue that it is 
not only theologically defensible, but inseparable from the confession of 
Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord. Indeed, I will defend the doctrine in what 
is arguably its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine and later 
defended in the Reformed theological tradition under the designation of 
“total depravity”—the claim that no aspect of our humanity is untouched 
by sin. (x)
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McFarland, no doubt, is swimming upstream since many (most?) mod-
ern theologians reject original sin outright. However, do not be fooled. 
McFarland does not simply restate earlier positions, but seeks to address 
modern questions that earlier generations did not have to answer.
In many ways, McFarland’s goal is accomplished. Throughout the book 
he has several strong statements affirming “total depravity.” Furthermore, 
McFarland challenges the popular assumption that free will must be de-
fined as the power of self-determination. He does so utilizing not only 
Augustine (chapter 3) but also Maximus the Confessor (chapter 4), a fig-
ure who (unlike Augustine) has flown under the radar of much contempo-
rary scholarship on the topic of whether God, rather than the will, “is the 
source of individual identity, since it is God whose call defines the good 
for a person” (xi). I applaud McFarland for resisting what seems to be the 
modern assumption, namely, that if the will is to be free, it must be self-
determined, libertarian, and contra-causal in nature. McFarland believes 
a libertarian view to be so problematic that it is found to “betray the good 
news of Jesus Christ, which is that we have been chosen and not that we 
have done the choosing” (xii). He clarifies, “This is not to deny that we 
quite obviously do choose all manner of things, still less to suggest that 
our relationship to God in Christ is anything other than free; but it is to 
insist that while we love God—and thereby are most truly and properly 
human—freely, that love, like all love, is, in its joy and freedom, beyond 
our capacity to choose” (xii).
Despite these strengths (and many others unmentioned), there is reason 
to believe that McFarland is inconsistent in applying his thesis. As cited 
above, McFarland’s intention is to defend the Christian doctrine of original 
sin by arguing that it is defensible theologically and inseparable from the 
confession of the gospel. So far so good. But then McFarland states that he 
will defend it in its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine and 
later defended in the “Reformed theological tradition under the designa-
tion of ‘total depravity.’” Here is where the confusion begins.
In the Reformed tradition original sin not only includes original cor-
ruption (sometimes called pollution) from where we get the doctrine of 
total depravity, but original guilt as well. Furthermore, it is from original 
guilt that original corruption is birthed. Therefore, Adam’s progeny in-
herit both a guilty status from Adam and a corrupt nature. However, not 
only does McFarland overlook both aspects (guilt and corruption) in his 
thesis, but the rest of his book demonstrates that he rejects the Reformed 
doctrine of original guilt entirely. For example, McFarland argues that if 
it is the case that “we sin because we are sinners”—the classic Reformed 
view—“the conclusion seems unavoidable that our sinful state is finally 
God’s responsibility as the one who made us that way” (148). Later on, 
McFarland rejects both the realist and federalist views that affirm origi-
nal guilt. Picking on the federal view he writes, “there is no reason why 
Adam’s being the first in a series should justify his representing the rest 
of the series in God’s sight.” God is made arbitrary, says McFarland, if 
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Adam is made our representative by whom we are counted guilty in his 
sin. Therefore, in light of these statements, it appears that McFarland’s 
thesis fails on two accounts: (1) Original sin in “its most extreme form” 
(as represented by Augustine and the Reformed) does not merely include 
total depravity but the imputation of guilt. McFarland fails to recognize 
this in his thesis. (2) McFarland does not actually defend original sin in 
“its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine” and the “Reformed 
tradition,” but actually rejects the imputation of guilt.
But more to the point still, McFarland has missed crucial arguments 
the Reformed make out of texts like Romans 5. A full defense cannot be 
made here (e.g., see works by John Murray), but a few points deserve 
mention. (1) In Romans 5 there is a clear parallel and contrast between 
Adam and Christ, one that is so strong it is impossible to avoid the conclu-
sion that Adam and Christ act as representatives (also see 1 Cor. 15:45–49). 
(2) When Paul says in Rom. 5:12, “because all sinned,” he is referring to 
Adam as our representative so that a reference to actual sins is precluded. 
Instead, Paul is arguing that it was through Adam’s sin that “all sinned.” 
(3) The reason death reins even when there was no law (before Moses; cf. 
5:12–14) is because on the basis of Adam’s sin all men who came thereafter 
were counted as guilty before God. (4) In Rom. 5:16–19 the imputation of 
guilt is inferred since Paul asserts that because of Adam’s trespass, all men 
are condemned before God. Paul then compares condemnation in Adam 
with justification in Christ. Clearly, forensic categories are in view. (5) If it 
is unfair for Adam’s guilt to be imputed to his progeny, then must we not 
also cry “unfair!” to Christ’s righteousness being imputed to us for our 
justification? Yet, this is the parallel Paul makes.
In the end, McFarland’s solution is difficult to make sense of. Original 
sin exists not because “we all somehow pre-exist in Adam (as in real-
ism), or because God has predetermined that Adam will stand for the 
whole human race (as in federalism), but simply because we are all one 
with Adam, and thus that we share with him—and with each other—the 
same nature, marked by the damaged wills that turn us all invariably and 
catastrophically away from God” (160). But what does this mean? How is 
being one “with” Adam different from being one “in” Adam? And how 
can McFarland say we are one “with Adam” because “we share with him 
. . . the same nature”? It is hard to see how McFarland avoids borrowing 
realist language. Again, I applaud McFarland for his affirmation of our 
pervasive corruption, but his explanation for how corruption is actually 
passed on is ambiguous and his rejection of imputed guilt struggles to 
make sense of texts like Romans 5 where representation language seems 
obvious.
Finally, McFarland argues that Christ himself assumes a fallen human 
nature in the incarnation, also meaning that Christ possesses a fallen 
human will and mind. He argues that such was necessary for Christ to be-
come like us in every way (Heb. 2:17–18). He also believes he is taking the 
fathers and creeds (e.g., Chalcedon) to their logical end, for what Christ 
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has not assumed he cannot redeem. However, there are serious concerns 
with such a novel proposal. First, It does not follow that Christ must as-
sume a fallen human nature, but only a human nature to truly be human 
like us. Sin is accidental to man’s nature, meaning Adam was not created 
sinful but became a sinner. Therefore, in order to be 100 percent human, 
Christ need only assume a human nature, not a fallen nature. Second, 
McFarland again ignores the representation language found throughout 
Scripture. The reason Jesus is able to atone for us is because he, as the 
God-man, acts as our representative before the Father (Rom. 5:15–21). 
His intercession, therefore, is not contingent on possessing a fallen human 
nature, an idea foreign to Scripture. Third, it is incomprehensible to see 
how Christ avoids being a sinner, condemned before the Father, if he as-
sumes our fallen human nature. Before we do anything good or bad, we 
come into this world inheriting a corrupt nature from Adam. Therefore, 
we stand guilty before God as those who possess a fallen nature. We are 
truly sinful in God’s sight and therefore culpable. So if we are condemned 
for our fallenness, is not Christ also? How then can Christ be said to be 
blameless not only in deed but in his person? It simply will not do to argue 
(as McFarland does) that Christ’s sinlessness is a function of his hypostasis 
and not of his human nature, for the two cannot be divorced from one 
another as the latter impacts and, in part, defines the former. How can a 
fallen human nature not result in a fallen person? Does the divine com-
pensate for the human, and if so have we not succumbed to Eutychianism? 
Fourth, McFarland wrongly argues that Christ can assume a fallen human 
nature since our sinful nature, though fallen, “remains good and not evil.” 
“However badly damaged it may be, our nature never separates us from 
God” (129). Such a statement is not Reformed but Semi-Pelagian. To the 
contrary, it is precisely because we have a fallen nature that we are unac-
ceptable before God (Ps. 51:5). And possessing a fallen nature does indeed 
create a massive relational breach between us and God (Eph. 2:1–5). Yes, 
God may continue to uphold the existence of our nature, but that in no 
way means he is in approval of our nature as fallen. The same, therefore, 
applies to Christ should he assume a fallen human nature.
To conclude, McFarland boldly takes on the challenges posed to the 
doctrine of original sin, and to his credit he seeks to answer questions pre-
vious generations of theologians did not have to. Nevertheless, his thesis is 
inconsistent and his solution to the puzzle of original sin remains unsatis-
fying. Going forward, theologians must address the questions McFarland 
seeks to answer, though in my opinion with a different solution.
